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To cite this article: Jennet Kirkpatrick (2022) The Fantasy of Exit: Campaign Use and Abuse of Exit in the UK's 2016 Brexit Debate, *New Political Science*, 44:2, 177-194, DOI: [10.1080/07393148.2022.2062197](https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2022.2062197)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2022.2062197>



Published online: 23 May 2022.



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# The Fantasy of Exit: Campaign Use and Abuse of Exit in the UK's 2016 Brexit Debate

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## ABSTRACT

Many political theorists have associated exit with positive attributes, seeing it as crucial individual sovereignty and self-determination. However, the 2016 Brexit debate about whether the U.K. should leave the E.U. revealed ambiguous and worrying uses of exit, especially concerning the spike in hate crimes after the referendum. We need to understand better how the concept of exit is changing in political discourse. Through studying the Brexit debate, I found conceptual connections between a national, sovereign exit and nativistic violence, which suggests that exit can be a dangerous concept. I argue we should move past a one-sided, optimistic view of exit and be attentive to exit's destructive potential in the future.

## Introduction

Many political theorists argue that exit is a beneficial political concept. Some argue, for instance, that the right to leave a political group or physically move to a new place – that is, the right to exit – benefits the individual.<sup>1</sup> Being able exit one's family, religion, civic associations, or even the nation can empower individuals to chart their life plans. Some theorists have argued that exit between nations, immigration, should be less restricted.<sup>2</sup> The denial of the right to leave one's country is "a more basic insult to human dignity than anything save loss of life itself, for it eliminates the means of escaping all other forms of persecution and injustice."<sup>3</sup> Cutting off exit creates a "prison" or a "new serfdom."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>W. A. Galston, "Two Concepts of Liberalism," *Ethics* 105, no. 3 (1995); Leslie Green, "Rights of Exit," *Legal Theory* 4, no. 02 (1998); Chandran Kukathas, *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Mark Warren, "Voting with Your Feet: Exit-Based Empowerment in Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 04 (2011).

<sup>2</sup>Joseph H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik, *Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Will Kymlicka, "Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism," *Comparative Migration Studies* 3, no. 1 (2015); Sarah Song, *Immigration and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); David Watkins, "Identity and the Demand for Inclusion: The Critique of Methodological Nationalism and the Political Theory of Immigration," *New Political Science* 42, no. 4 (2020).

<sup>3</sup>Alan Dowty, "The Right of Personal Self-Determination," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 3, no. 1 (1989): 16.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 12; Hersch Lauterpacht, *International Bill of the Rights of Man* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 130.

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

This positive view of exit seems incomplete considering Brexit, the 2016 referendum in which the United Kingdom (U.K.) voted to leave the European Union (E.U.). Brexit, as the portmanteau suggests, focused on a departure: should one nation leave a supranational organization? A vital element of the debate was immigration, the physical exit of individuals from E.U. countries to the U.K. It would be surprising if exit were cast in wholly benign terms in this messy, heated debate. Indeed, the Brexit referendum led to a spike in hate crimes motivated by racial and national origin prejudice.<sup>5</sup> Carr et al. find a “15-25% rise in recorded hate crime as a result of the Brexit referendum,” and they rule out changes in reporting behavior and police behavior as influencing this rise.<sup>6</sup>

Looking further into the Brexit debate, I argue that exit can be conceptually linked to hate and violence, a linkage that troubles scholars’ generally positive view of exit. The Brexit campaign pushed the idea of exit in new directions distinct from the existing literature. I call these new directions the “fantasy of exit.” Each side engaged in a fantasy about an exit. The Remain party, Britain Stronger Europe (BSE), deployed fantasies about immigration as a sovereign departure by model immigrants unconstrained by money, class, or connections. Though BSE’s fantasy of exit may be fraught with danger, too, I am primarily interested in the fantasy of exit promulgated by the Brexiteer’s party, Vote Leave (VL). I focus on VL because the association between exit and violence is not speculative in this case: VL’s adherents committed hate crimes. Also, there are good normative reasons for understanding the role of political concepts, such as exit, in legitimating violence against vulnerable groups.

In the first section of the paper, I briefly illuminate why scholars have viewed exit in a positive light. In the following two sections of the paper, I analyze BSE and VL’s campaign materials, including speeches, newspaper articles, op-eds, videos, posters, social media posts, reports, leaflets, expert statements, fact sheets, and other similar materials.<sup>7</sup>

In the fourth section, I home in on VL’s fantasy of exit, arguing that it mapped ideas about individual exit as a mechanism to sovereignty onto the nation-state. So doing, it likened the state to a person who, through an exit, could become a sovereign, self-defined entity. Finally, in the fifth section, I describe the conceptual connections between exit, national sovereignty, and hate crimes. Here, I refer to Hannah Arendt, who warned about the purifying dangers of sovereignty.

## Exit Literature: An Optimistic View

My argument is that exit is not as innocuous or propitious as some theorists have thought. As a first step, it is crucial to look briefly at some scholars’ favorable view of exit. Next, we need to understand why some scholars thought that exit is a beneficial component of individual freedom. By seeing the optimistic view of exit at the start,

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<sup>5</sup>Jon Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State,” *Race & class* 58, no. 4 (2017); Joel Carr et al., “Love Thy Neighbor? Brexit and Hate Crime,” <http://ftp.iza.org/dp13902.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup>“Love Thy Neighbor? Brexit and Hate Crime” 2, 30–31.

<sup>7</sup>I look closely at BSE and VL because the Electoral Commission designated both lead campaigners in 2016. After the referendum, the Electoral Commission found that VL broke electoral law and, in addition to fining the organization, referred the case to the police for further investigation.

we will be in a better position to appreciate the negative, destructive role of exit in Brexit.

### **Exit and Individual Sovereignty**

For many theorists, a key benefit of exit is individual sovereignty. For example, Chandran Kukathas argues that exit is a fundamental right that allows individuals to choose where they will live and the groups they want to be a part of.<sup>8</sup> For Kukathas, exit is an umbrella concept that includes freedom of movement and association and, as such, it is a mechanism of individual sovereignty. Leslie Green also associates exit with “the familiar notion of personal autonomy.” As Green sees it, exit is essential to “enhance the capacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends. Exit is necessary ... to secure individual autonomy.”<sup>9</sup> In summarizing the exit literature, Sigal Ben-Porath notes that for many scholars, the exit right provides “a key way of ensuring that all individuals have an opportunity to exercise autonomy.” Exit is “an expression of personal choice.”<sup>10</sup> Exit allows individuals to reflect on their choices, character, and commitments and plan their lives accordingly.

For these theorists, exit is more than the capacity to go wherever one pleases. They construct exit as a tool of individual sovereignty and self-expression: exit permits individuals to reveal who they want to be and pursue their chosen life course. Where one is born need not limit the individual, for instance. Nor should the religious, political, or social groups that the individual is born into be a limitation. For these theorists, individuals should be free to exit inherited groups and choose new associations better suited to their ends and values. For some scholars, then, exit permits free individuals to choose a life plan that accords with their goals, talents, and principles. Exit creates individual autonomy.

### **Exit and Struggle**

Some feminist theorists have pushed back against the wholly positive characterization of exit as a method of individual self-determination. They question whether exit is a viable option for vulnerable individuals in liberal democracies and ask whether women and girls living within tight-knit, illiberal groups could meaningfully exercise the right of exit. Could a woman or girl living in a small fundamentalist religious sect, for instance, realistically leave her community and start a new life?

These scholars emphasize that exit can be an arduous process, especially for some. For example, Susan Okin points out that exit can be nearly impossible for vulnerable individuals, especially women and girls, who may be socialized to stay in an oppressive community or suffer low self-esteem. For these women, the legal right to exit may be unthinkable.<sup>11</sup> Ayelet Shachar identifies a related problem. She argues that

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<sup>8</sup>C Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?,” *Political Theory* (1992): 116.

<sup>9</sup>Green, “Rights of Exit,” 176.

<sup>10</sup>Sigal Ben-Porath, “Exit Rights and Entrance Paths: Accommodating Cultural Diversity in a Liberal Democracy,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 04 (2010): 1023, 30. Also see Brian Barry, “Review Article: ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,’” *British Journal of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (1974); Warren, “Voting with Your Feet: Exit-Based Empowerment in Democratic Theory.”; Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism.”

<sup>11</sup>Susan Moller Okin, “‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit,” *ibid.* 112, no. 2 (2002): 222. For a critique, see Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Leti Volpp, “Feminism Versus Multiculturalism,” *Columbia Law Review* 101, no. 5 (2001).

the right to exit places a burden on individuals. It suggests that the individuals are ultimately responsible for finding solutions to their problems and crafting the life they desire. Exit “throws on the already beleaguered individual the responsibility to either miraculously transform the legal-institutional conditions that keep her vulnerable or find the resources to leave her whole world behind.”<sup>12</sup> Though more optimistic about the right of exit as a viable option for vulnerable individuals, Jacob Levy agreed that the person exiting may experience significant loss.<sup>13</sup> Though exit may be empowering, these theorists argue that it is not easy.

It is important to note that, despite the disagreement about viability, most theorists engaged in this debate agree that exit is a path to individual autonomy. The disagreement centers on whether all individuals can use an exit, not on troubling exit as a method of sovereignty and self-definition. Moreover, none of these theorists associate exit with violence, harm, or oppression. Quite the opposite is the case. Even theorists critical of exit rights as “offer[ing] little more than lip service” see exit in a positive, beneficial light. Thus, they have explored how the state could extend exit rights to vulnerable individuals.<sup>14</sup>

### Exit Defines Free Individuals: Britain Stronger in Europe

As we have seen, some scholars writing before Brexit saw exit as an expression of individual sovereignty and self-definition. They argued that exit allows individuals to pursue their life plans. Other scholars pointed out that it could be an arduous process for women, girls, and vulnerable minorities.

With this brief overview of the theoretical literature, we can now examine how exit was used in the Brexit campaign by Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE). My argument focuses on the other side of the campaign: VL’s novel and disturbing connection between exit, hate, and violence. First, I begin with BSE because many of its arguments echo the scholarly literature’s affirmative view of individual sovereign exits. Second, BSE’s arguments about exit at the individual level are crucial to understanding VL’s arguments about exit *at the national level*. Third, it is easier to comprehend the unorthodox conceptual move VL made about the nation-state if we start with BSE’s more standard focus on exit by individuals.

BSE positive view of exit focused on individual exits via immigration. While BSE was opposed to the U.K. leaving the E.U., it offered an affirmative view of E.U. individuals who wanted to relocate to the U.K. It saw immigrants as beneficial. BSE’s campaign materials constructed E.U. immigrants to the U.K. as purposeful, dedicated workers who knew who they were and what they wanted. Immigrants were self-determined and self-aware. BSE also saw immigrants as the source of the U.K.’s future economic growth and prosperity. BSE argued that those who “come here to work hard, pay their taxes, and contribute to our economy and support our public services should be

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<sup>12</sup>A Shachar, “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability,” *Political Theory* (2000): 80.

<sup>13</sup>Jacob T. Levy, “Sexual Orientation, Exit and Refuge,” in *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity*, ed. Avigail I. Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 176.

<sup>14</sup>Ben-Porath, “Exit Rights and Entrance Paths: Accommodating Cultural Diversity in a Liberal Democracy,” 1022.

welcomed.”<sup>15</sup> It pointed to the tangible benefits of immigration, such as 130,000 E.U. citizens working in the healthcare system, the 1.5 million people employed by businesses owned by E.U. citizens, and the £20 billion more E.U. citizens made in tax contributions than they took out in benefits.<sup>16</sup> Experts challenged these figures, but they serve to underscore BSE’s optimistic view of immigration. E.U. citizens in the U.K. are “contributors, not freeloaders.”<sup>17</sup> As BSE presented it, immigrants were valued because they created wealth.

BSE’s optimistic view of E.U. immigration was tied to the negative economic repercussions of leaving the E.U. single market, a trade area without tariffs and barriers consisting of 28 nations and 500 million consumers.<sup>18</sup> Before Brexit, almost half of the U.K.’s trade was with the E.U., which led BSE and a consensus of economists to conclude that leaving would damage the U.K. economy.<sup>19</sup> BSE argued that free trade in the E.U. produced free trade globally, allowing the U.K. to benefit from E.U. free trade agreements with approximately 50 more countries across the globe. In addition, the U.K. had “clout we could never have on our own,” because it was an E.U. member.<sup>20</sup>

For BSE, the economic benefits of free movement and free trade were straightforward: “Being in Europe means more jobs, more growth, and more investment in the U.K.”<sup>21</sup> BSE emphasized the economic benefits for individuals and families currently living in the U.K. Remaining in the E.U. meant “cheaper prices on your weekly shop, fuel, energy bills and flights to Europe.” Leaving the E.U. would mean less money for “family holidays, a deposit on a new home, a new car or starting a family.”<sup>22</sup> BSE quantified the potential loss for individual families, arguing that U.K. households would lose £3000 per household by leaving the E.U.<sup>23</sup>

The general idea behind the BSE campaign was that everyone would be better off financially if people, services, and goods were allowed to move freely throughout the single market. BSE linked free movement and cultural pluralism to an easy rise in national economic growth. Immigrants seeking out economic opportunities in the U.K. and creating businesses that traded with the E.U., for instance, were a boon to the U.K. economy. At the same time, U.K. citizens could continue to study, work, or retire in E.U. countries with ease. BSE constructed free movement as a necessity in a globalized, cosmopolitan world.

BSE’s optimistic view of individual exit (immigration) was premised on a high degree of individual autonomy. To BSE, free international movement in the E.U. meant

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<sup>15</sup>Most BSE materials are from the official website <https://www.strongerin.co.uk/#iC5TcqQUSQIgyIKM.97>.

<sup>16</sup>BSE, “Why Do We Get EU Immigrants Here?,” [https://www.strongerin.co.uk/why\\_do\\_we\\_get\\_eu\\_immigrants\\_here#FVCrjHBybAzZEKpo.97](https://www.strongerin.co.uk/why_do_we_get_eu_immigrants_here#FVCrjHBybAzZEKpo.97).

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>BSE, “Why Britain Is Stronger in Europe’s Single Market,” [https://www.strongerin.co.uk/for\\_campaigners#YGBuYDFeQ0aicPfy.97](https://www.strongerin.co.uk/for_campaigners#YGBuYDFeQ0aicPfy.97).

<sup>19</sup>“Why We Need to Remain in the EU: What the Experts Say,” <https://www.strongerin.co.uk/experts#LImY0bTfc5e7mpZI.97>.

<sup>20</sup>“A Stronger Economy,” <https://www.strongerin.co.uk/economy#SisFE5KRPwuxYW0K.97>.

<sup>21</sup>“Does Being in the EU Stop Us from Trading with the Rest of the World?,” [https://www.strongerin.co.uk/does\\_being\\_in\\_the\\_eu\\_stop\\_us\\_trading\\_with\\_the\\_rest\\_of\\_the\\_world#TUhZC7AAVQP79esD.97](https://www.strongerin.co.uk/does_being_in_the_eu_stop_us_trading_with_the_rest_of_the_world#TUhZC7AAVQP79esD.97).

<sup>22</sup>“Your Questions Answered: The Economy,” [https://www.strongerin.co.uk/the\\_economy#ft10Lg0D9vvTIEdm.97](https://www.strongerin.co.uk/the_economy#ft10Lg0D9vvTIEdm.97).

<sup>23</sup>“A Stronger Economy.”

more individual control over one's life plan. "In the E.U. you can find work, holiday and retire without visas, and study abroad on the Erasmus programme, offering you and your family even more ways to get on in life."<sup>24</sup> More free movement across the E.U. provided an immense sphere of options for living and thus provided the individual with greater self-determination over her or his life plan.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, many E.U. citizens understand the E.U. in terms of free movement. When asked, "What does the E.U. mean?" 42% of respondents indicated that it means "freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the E.U."<sup>26</sup>

My point about BSE is that the group had an affirmative view of individual exits (immigration): it constructed immigration as a mechanism of individual self-determination. By choosing to leave one E.U. country for the U.K., BSE reasoned, immigrants demonstrated that they were independent individuals who wanted to contribute to the U.K.'s economy. BSE constructed immigrants as striving, self-sufficient individuals who would contribute to the economy and not need government assistance. The group depicted domestic voters as self-interested individuals whose personal lives (finances, travel, education) would benefit from continued E.U. membership. BSE encouraged "self-expression values" that prioritized quality of life, tolerance, and well-being.<sup>27</sup> BSE's vision was of a diverse, prosperous U.K. composed of individuals who were free to become who or what they wanted.

### Exit Creates a Free Nation: Vote Leave

As we have seen, BSE had a favorable view of exit. It believed that a certain kind of individual exit was beneficial to the U.K. BSE admired (and constructed) a model E.U. immigrant who came to the U.K. in search of a better life. Though BSE departed from the scholarly literature on crucial points, BSE made many similar associations between exit and individual freedom. For BSE, leaving was a mechanism of individual autonomy; exit allowed immigrants to be free and sovereign. Through exit from homelands (and entrance into the U.K.), individuals realized their life goals and executed their life plans.

So far, we have seen two affirmative views of exit, in theory and practice. My argument, however, is that exit is a concept that we should be cautious about; it has a dangerous potential. In this section, I turn to VL, the official campaign group that argued successfully in favor of leaving the E.U., to home in on exit's menacing side.

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<sup>24</sup>"Would I Still Be Able to Travel across Europe If We Left?," [https://www.strongerin.co.uk/would\\_i\\_still\\_be\\_able\\_to\\_travel\\_across\\_europe\\_if\\_we\\_left#ff6Yl657Vbbl20X.97](https://www.strongerin.co.uk/would_i_still_be_able_to_travel_across_europe_if_we_left#ff6Yl657Vbbl20X.97).

<sup>25</sup>Adrian Favell, "The Fourth Freedom," *European Journal of Social Theory* 17, no. 3 (2014); Charlotte O'Brien, "The Pillory, the Precipice and the Slippery Slope: The Profound Effects of the UK's Legal Reform Programme Targeting EU Migrants," *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law* (2015); Charlotte O'Brien, "I Trade, Therefore, I Am: Legal Personhood in the European Union," *Common Market Law Review* 50 (2018); Owen Parker, "Critical Political Economy, Free Movement and Brexit: Beyond the Progressive's Dilemma," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2017); Owen Parker and James Brassett, "Contingent Borders, Ambiguous Ethics: Migrants in (International) Political Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (2005).

<sup>26</sup>Owen Parker and Oscar Lopez Catalan, "Free Movement for Whom, Where, When? Roma EU Citizens in France and Spain," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 4 (2014): 308.

<sup>27</sup>Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

VL's ideas were associated with the spike in hate crimes after the referendum; VL backers threatened and attacked individuals they took to be immigrants.

As a first step to understanding this outcome, we need to understand better how VL conceptualized exit. VL constructed exit as a positive, affirmative mechanism of change – *for the nation-state*. VL hit on many of the same themes that BSE associated with individualistic exit: freedom, self-determination, self-definition. However, at the same time, VL made a special conceptual move because it mapped affirmative ideas of exit at the individual level onto the nation-state.

VL's campaign focused on two political problems that it saw as related: first, the decline of the U.K. as a national political power and, second, the rise of the E.U. as an overbearing force in U.K. domestic politics. VL argued that exiting the E.U. would solve both problems. Leaving would allow the U.K. to limit immigration and isolate the U.K. from the E.U.'s meddling influence.<sup>28</sup> In more general terms, exit would emancipate the U.K., allowing the nation to be independent.

E.U. control was not, VL argued, an accidental or unfortunate turn of events but rather a deliberate attempt to undermine U.K. power. "We are seeing a slow and invisible process of legal colonisation, as the E.U. infiltrates just about every element of public policy."<sup>29</sup> No longer the colonizer, the U.K. was becoming the colonized. "We have become so used to Nanny in Brussels that we have become infantilized, incapable of imagining an independent future." Thus, the public "can see all too plainly the impotence of their own elected politicians."<sup>30</sup> Remaining in the E.U., the U.K. "will be subject to most of the integration that the Eurozone is poised to embark upon whether we like it or not. We will have little or no say in what they decide is necessary to pursue their goal of political union."<sup>31</sup> As these quotations show, VL constructed the U.K. as a colonized and subjugated nation that was unable to chart its future.

VL argued that returning "democratic sovereignty" to the U.K. would prevent further subjugation and infantilization. Though VL used this term variously, it equaled restoring democratic sovereignty with national control and cohesion. The general argument was that decreasing the voting area to the U.K. would increase the power of British voters and the accountability of British politicians. As VL argued, a more extensive region was not better for democracies. Without E.U. voters diluting their preferences, British voters could express their concerns more clearly through the nation.

Moreover, as VL presented its case, British voters would be listened to by the U.K. government. Membership in the E.U. resulted in "the inability of people to kick out, at elections, the men and women who control their lives ... This is the only opportunity

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<sup>28</sup>Unless otherwise noted, quotations in this section are from the V.L. website. Most can be found under the "Key Speeches, interviews, and op-eds" tab in the "Briefing Room." See [http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why\\_vote\\_leave.html](http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html) and [http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/key\\_speeches\\_interviews\\_and\\_op\\_ed.html](http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/key_speeches_interviews_and_op_ed.html). In cases where material on the V.L. and the BSE websites were first published elsewhere, I provide the citation for the original publication.

<sup>29</sup>Boris Johnson, "There Is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want – Vote to Leave the EU," *The Telegraph*, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/03/16/boris-johnson-exclusive-there-is-only-one-way-to-get-the-change/>.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Chris Grayling, "We Must Vote Leave to Protect Our Sovereignty and Democracy from Further EU Integration," *Vote Leave* website, [http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/chris\\_grayling\\_we\\_must\\_vote\\_leave\\_to\\_protect\\_our\\_sovereignty\\_and\\_democracy\\_from\\_further\\_eu\\_integration.html](http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/chris_grayling_we_must_vote_leave_to_protect_our_sovereignty_and_democracy_from_further_eu_integration.html).



we will ever have to show that we care about self-rule.”<sup>32</sup> VL also argued that British politicians could represent the interests of British voters more accurately because they would no longer be beholden to European interests.

A central message of the VL website was that exit meant sovereign control: “We can control immigration.” “We’ll be in charge of our own borders.” Voting to leave would honor the U.K.’s tradition of parliamentary democracy – “the most valuable British export and the one for which we are most famous” – and protect British democracy from external international influence. Though the E.U. is a democracy, VL depicted it as a hostile, anti-democratic force. Great nations, VL implied, do not take democratic sovereignty lightly. Guarding against the corrosive effect of outside international influences, the U.K. should jealously protect its democracy by separating itself from the E.U. Boris Johnson suggested that Brexit would restore the U.K.’s global power. “We used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen ... we [will] regain our influence in the wider world and become a truly global nation once again.”<sup>33</sup>

Along with democratic sovereignty, VL also focused on immigration, suggesting that Brexit would end the E.U. Treaty principle of free movement of people and limit E.U. immigration to the U.K.<sup>34</sup> VL constructed immigrants as interfering with social cohesion, creating disorder, and increasing crime. Immigration has led to the “displacement of the British people.”<sup>35</sup> U.K. society had been thrown into confusion because “tens of thousands of people with little or no qualifications from Central Europe” had entered the country.<sup>36</sup>

VL constructed immigrants as a destructive force that dismantled a middle-class lifestyle based on homeownership, ruined nationalized healthcare, and degraded the natural environment and greenspaces.<sup>37</sup> VL argued for reducing immigration from Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria and targeted these national groups as a particular concern. It also released a poster directed at Turkey, stating, “Turkey (population 76 million) is Joining the E.U.” (see [Appendix Figure A1](#)). At the same time, some VL advocates suggested increasing immigration from commonwealth countries and countries seen as culturally like the U.K. While some argued for a points-based immigration system, others suggested extending free movement rights and free trade to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Johnson, “There Is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want – Vote to Leave the EU.”

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.; Jon Stone, “British People Are Proud of Colonialism and the British Empire, Poll Finds,” *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-people-are-proud-of-colonialism-and-the-british-empire-poll-finds-a6821206.html>.

<sup>34</sup>Critics pointed out that V.L. misrepresented the details of the U.K.’s immigration policies: The U.K. was not a part of the “free movement of people” before the referendum and did not participate in the Schengen border-free zone. Still, V.L.’s arguments serve to underscore the group’s negative view of immigration from E.U. countries.

<sup>35</sup>David Wooding, “Unwise Monkeys: ‘Sneering’ David Cameron, Gordon Brown and John Major Branded Bananas by Brexit-Baking Priti Patel,” *The Sun*, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/1177032/unwise-monkeys-sneering-david-cameron-gordon-brown-and-john-major-branded-bananas-by-brexit-backing-priti-patel/>.

<sup>36</sup>John Mills, “Why Top Labour Donor Is Backing Calls for a Brexit from the EU,” <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/john-mills-why-top-labour-donor-backing-calls-brexit-eu-1523589>.

<sup>37</sup>James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, “Brexit and the Perils of ‘Europeanised’ Migration,” *Journal of European Public Policy* (2018). Liam Fox, “Memories of Green? The Costs of Uncontrolled Migration,”

<sup>38</sup>Jon Moynihan et al., “Immigration: Britain Can Only Control Who Comes in If We Leave the EU,” *The Telegraph*, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11698869/immigration-britain-can-only-control-who-comes-in-if-we-leave-the-eu.html>; Daniel Hannan, “The First Thing We Should Do When We Leave the EU Is Offer Free Trade and Free Movement to Australia and New Zealand,” <https://twitter.com/DanielJHannan/status/533324157510254592>.

Some conservative politicians referred to immigrants in dehumanizing terms. For example, David Cameron described the people in Calais trying to reach the U.K. as a “swarm of migrants.” At the same time, Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond said that millions of “marauding African migrants posed a threat to the U.K.”<sup>39</sup> In June of 2016, Nigel Farage released a poster that depicted a long line of migrants with the caption “Breaking Point: Britain has Failed Us All.” (See [Appendix Figure A2](#)).

This brief history of VL arguments gives insight into how this campaign connected exiting with sovereignty and, in some cases, nativism. The campaign homed in on an outside enemy, the meddling, hostile, and destabilizing E.U. VL cast the E.U. as distorting British parliamentary democracy and diluting the power of the British citizenry to assert its will over its affairs. Some in VL argued that the U.K. citizenry was becoming varied, different, and unstable. They portrayed E.U. migrants and residents as upending the “ancient majority” of English or British-born citizens who dominated British politics for centuries.<sup>40</sup>

VL presented Brexit as a stabilizing move that would, among other things, bring sovereignty and social cohesion to the U.K. This aspiration is ironic, of course, because VL’s victory did not bring the British people together but has further divided them.<sup>41</sup> Still, VL’s vision was to create a sovereign and stable nation through an exit.

## A Nation Walks Away Like a Person

We are now in an excellent position to interpret VL’s view of exit and draw some initial conceptual connections about the destructive potential of exit. At first glance, however, VL’s arguments about exit do not appear particularly menacing. VL presented a positive view of exit. It argued that a national exit would lead to enormous benefits for the U.K.: restored national sovereignty, more significant international influence, and a cohesive national identity.

I argue that underneath VL’s sunny depiction lies a destructive potential. To see this, we need to focus on VL’s critical conceptual move: mapping common understandings of exit as a mechanism for individual sovereignty onto the state. VL cannibalized two benefits associated with an exit for the individual – sovereignty, and definition of values – and applied them to the nation-state. As VL presented it, the nation-state could walk away like a person and, so doing, attain political control (sovereignty) and clarify what it valued (values).

## Sovereign Person/Nation

As we saw in section II, BSE emphasized exit at the individual level, arguing that free movement throughout the E.U. would help sovereign individuals control their lives and benefit the U.K. economy. According to BSE, the capacity to leave gives individuals autonomy over themselves and their lives. Thus, BSE welcomed sovereign,

<sup>39</sup>Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State,” 90–91.

<sup>40</sup>Michael Walzer, *What It Means to Be an American*, 1st ed. (New York: Marsilio, 1992); Ailsa Henderson et al., “England, Englishness and Brexit,” *The Political Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (2016).

<sup>41</sup>Sophie Chappell, “Political Deliberation under Conditions of Deception: The Case of Brexit,” *Think* 15, no. 44 (2016); Albert Weale, “The Democratic Duty to Oppose Brexit,” *Political Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (2017).

self-supporting immigrants and E.U. residents committed to working hard, paying taxes, and supporting public services.<sup>42</sup> For U.K. citizens, BSE also emphasized the benefits of individual exit as a means of sovereignty. U.K. students, for instance, could actualize their life plans by studying abroad and seeking educational opportunities that may not have been available to them in the U.K.<sup>43</sup>

BSE assumed that exit created a path to sovereignty, or the capacity to develop a plan and act according to it. By individual sovereignty, BSE generally meant control, not in the sense of self-regulation or absolute power, but rather in terms of ruling over one's affairs. To be sovereign was to develop one's course of action for the future. Sovereignty did not just happen. It needed exit to make it a viable proposition. Exit created sovereignty.

VL appealed to a broadly similar idea of exit as a mechanism of sovereign control but applied it to the nation-state. Leaving the E.U. would allow the U.K. to control its affairs. "We can control immigration." "We'll be in charge of our own borders." Control and being in charge were central themes, apparent in the word cloud in [Appendix 1](#). Exit meant popular control over representatives. It would convey the people's ability "to kick out, at elections, the men and women who control their lives."<sup>44</sup> As one proponent put it, staying in the E.U. would weaken national power: "Our sovereignty will diminish. Our ability to look after our own national interests will diminish . . . I want us to live an independent sovereign country. I want us to take back control of our democracy."<sup>45</sup> VL argued that the result of a sovereign exit would be increased national wealth and restored stature as a world power.

### **Personal/National Values**

We can see a similar type of mapping around values. BSE argued that free movement across the E.U. allowed individuals to express their values. Self-definition and self-expression could happen through travel, for instance. However, as one commentator put it, "Brexit raises other key questions: would U.K. citizens ever enjoy visa and passport-free movement across Europe again?"<sup>46</sup> The BSE campaign emphasized that young people in the U.K. needed a cosmopolitan world in which the free mixing of people allowed them "make friends in every corner of the world" and "campaign for global causes, whether tackling climate change, fighting poverty or giving sanctuary to refugees."<sup>47</sup> The capacity to live abroad and develop oneself according to one's values was vital.

As we saw in Section I, VL presented exit as a mechanism of clarifying the U.K.'s values. By exiting from the E.U., the U.K. could define itself as a sovereign nation with distinct values from the E.U. Depicting the referendum as more than an average vote, VL positioned Brexit as a normative statement of national character. For VL, the

<sup>42</sup>Inés Valdez, "Punishment, Race, and the Organization of U.S. Immigration Exclusion," *Political Research Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (2016).

<sup>43</sup>Megan Dunn, "EU Referendum: Britain's Students Are Stronger in Europe," *Independent*, October 11, 2015 2015.

<sup>44</sup>Johnson, "There Is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want – Vote to Leave the EU."

<sup>45</sup>Grayling, "We Must Vote Leave to Protect Our Sovereignty and Democracy from Further EU Integration."

<sup>46</sup>Richard Branson, "If You Vote Leave, You Won't Kick the Establishment in the B\*\*S . . . You'll Shoot Yourself in the Foot," *Daily Mail*, June 18, 2016 2016.

<sup>47</sup>Dunn, "EU Referendum: Britain's Students Are Stronger in Europe."

referendum posed an implicit question: what does it mean to be British?<sup>48</sup> VL asserted that the U.K. should be more firmly rooted in a traditional ethnic, nativistic core. Exit would accelerate this process; it would construct a homogeneous political identity. VL's point of reference was America, a nation it saw as an independent and forceful actor. This comparison was inapt because the United States is a multicultural nation that some compare to the E.U. After all, it is a federation. Erasing these complications, VL depicted the U.S. as an autonomous nation with a solid national identity. "The U.S. guards its democracy with more hysterical jealousy than any other country on earth ... America is the only country in the world that has so far failed to sign up to the U.N. convention on the rights of the child, or the U.N. convention on the emancipation of women".<sup>49</sup> As VL saw it, America defined its identity as a sovereign nation by refusing to participate in international agreements. Here and elsewhere, VL equated not joining with professing values and norms. The U.S. declared that it believed in sovereignty, democracy, and self-interest by refusing international initiatives. Moreover, as VL presented it, the U.S.'s denials also expressed antipathy for vulnerable or discriminated groups. VL suggested that denying rights to children and women indicates sovereignty, global power, and self-awareness.

We can see this mapping move here: exit to express individual values became exit to reveal national values. Exit is assumed to be a critical juncture that communicates deeply held beliefs and principles. Exit reaffirmed these values internally (for the individual or the nation) and broadcasted them externally. Leaving is understood to create a sense of self through otherness and differentiation—the act of separating defined the nation or the self as a distinct entity. Through the exit, the nation or the individual expressed "who it was" or "what it stood for." Seen as a defining moment, exit disclosed the nation's or individual's character. The underlying metaphor seems to be of a political birth or rebirth. No mother is required, however. The individual or the state is born of its power. The general idea was that leaving created otherness, which was partly constituted by values, principles, and ideals. Exit also revealed these same ideals, making public what had been hidden.

### Exit, Sovereignty, and Hate

The last section showed how VL transferred positive ideas about individual exit onto the state. This move was unusual. It contrasts with BSE and much of the scholarly literature, which presented exit as a mechanism of *individual* sovereignty and self-definition.

I argue this was also a dangerous move that may have paved the conceptual way to hate crimes. We are now in an excellent position to probe why seeing the state like an exiting person is a risky move. The most straightforward answer is that seeing the state as a person assumes that the nation should be a singular, cohesive, and uniform entity, which it is not. This state-as-person metaphor ascribes great cohesion and efficacy to the nation. Moreover, in the case of the U.K., it created political aspirations that could not be met realistically. A democratic, multicultural polity like the U.K. is, by definition,

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<sup>48</sup>Henderson et al., "England, Englishness and Brexit."

<sup>49</sup>Johnson, "There Is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want – Vote to Leave the EU."

composed of a wide variety of groups that see the political world in distinct ways. It is not singular, cohesive, or uniform. Moreover, this state-as-person dream is normatively at odds with a pluralistic notion of democratic freedom. Those groups who trouble this vision of the state as a single, cohesive person – who ruin the image of an indivisible sovereign power – may become fodder for its re-constitution.

### **Easy Exit**

An initial problem with VL's metaphor of state-as-person is that it presumed that Brexit would be an easy process. VL's narrative assumed that the U.K. could exit the E.U. much as a person might exit a room: the U.K. could get up and walk out. Moreover, VL envisioned a national exit was an easy route to national awareness and a cohesive identity. VL was confident that single action, leaving the E.U., would create a nation with a more cohesive sense of itself. This confidence was largely unexplained and, given current demographic information, ungrounded. VL was silent as to how leaving the E.U. would address the current diversity within the U.K. At best, leaving the E.U. would limit future immigration, but it would do nothing about the pluralism in the U.K. or unite its inhabitants. Theorists have long noted that establishing a political identity can be arduous and fraught. For example, knowing what it means to be British is to know who you are, not as an individual but as a member of a collective.<sup>50</sup> This knowledge can be both ineffable and beneficial. For example, political identity can clarify what separates your community from others, can provide a feeling of belonging and standing, and may be used to mark insiders and outsiders who live together in the same physical space.

In other words, VL encouraged magical thinking about the thorny problem of collective identity. Figuring out how to encourage unity among a diverse population is a legitimate conundrum.<sup>51</sup> However, VL ignored this genuine political problem and willfully overlooked the facts of diversity and pluralism in the country. Instead, it moralized exit, casting it as an honorable action that would lead to innumerable benefits to the U.K. The exit was noble, VL suggested, and it would bring all good things. Some in VL wanted a cohesive, nativistic identity, resulting in a nation freed of the influx of outsiders, strangers, or those seen as allied with the E.U. Here, we see exiting like a sovereign person being allied with anti-pluralism.

### **Hate Crimes**

We can extend this connection between the sovereign nation and anti-pluralism further by looking at the hate crimes that followed for about a month after the Brexit referendum. The Home Office reported a 41% rise in recorded hate crimes, while scholars find a 15-25% rise.<sup>52</sup> From a theory perspective, we can observe, first, that

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<sup>50</sup>Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Walzer, *What It Means to Be an American*; Richard Bellamy, "Evaluating Union Citizenship: Belonging, Rights and Participation within the EU," *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 6 (2008); David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Song, *Immigration and Democracy*.

<sup>51</sup>Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, "Brexit and the Myth of a British National Identity," *British Politics* 16 (2021): 117, 18.

<sup>52</sup>Carr et al., "Love Thy Neighbor? Brexit and Hate Crime"; Hannah Corcoran and Kevin Smith, "Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16," in *Statistical Bulletin 11/16* (Home Office, 2016).

informal evidence supports a conceptual link between VL's arguments and the rise in hate crimes following the referendum.<sup>53</sup> One perpetrator, indicating that "this lot" lost the election, reportedly said that it was time for immigrants to "go back" out of "our country." Another accosted a woman walking with her 9-year-old daughter and, tearing at her niqab, stated, "You're in Britain, live by British rules." In another case, a man told an Eastern European woman, "Just go home. We voted you out. You will have to leave the country soon." He asserted that the police would not help her. Call "whoever [sic] you want" because this is "our country, our law."<sup>54</sup>

Though harsher and more openly violent, these statements echo some of the ideas of the VL campaign: the U.K.'s exit would restore British sovereignty and bring control back to the native, non-immigrant population. The framing suggests an "us-vs-them" vision illuminated by the repeated use of "our" and "we."<sup>55</sup> Perpetrators emphasize 'our country,' 'our law,' and 'we voted.' They also draw attention to British rules and British law, defining them as external or alien to the victims.

These statements and the hate crimes also suggest a violent agenda may be connected to some VL arguments that exit would create a more racially and ethnically homogeneous population with a more cohesive national identity. VL failed to explain how this vision could be accomplished given existing multiculturalism in the U.K. It failed to illuminate how the state-as-sovereign person could become a cohesive entity. VL left adherents with a pronounced gap between what it envisioned the state as and facts on the ground. The perpetrators of hate crimes closed the gap. They abused and used violence against those deemed different, encouraging these citizens and individuals to 'go home or to 'go back,' actions that created the homogeneous nation that VL promised.

## **Arendt**

We can understand this connection between sovereignty and hate crime through Arendt, who thought national sovereignty could be a destructive concept.<sup>56</sup> Arendt argues that national sovereignty has the potential to suffocate pluralism. As she puts it, sovereignty's "uncompromising self-sufficiency" is "contradictory to the very concept of plurality."<sup>57</sup> Arendt sees the goal of creating a sovereign, ethnically unified nation as being at odds with diversity. Rather than creating a political context in which citizens can act together while being different, sovereignty stifles divergence among citizens. For Arendt, public freedom occurs through an open process among distinct citizens who speak and act. Sovereignty denies freedom, according to Arendt, because it suggests some predetermined will.

Moreover, Arendt connects sovereignty with violence. Arendt writes that it is "dangerous to believe that one can be free – as an individual or a group – only if he

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<sup>53</sup>Carr et al., "Love Thy Neighbor? Brexit and Hate Crime."

<sup>54</sup>Burnett, "Racial Violence and the Brexit State.," Corcoran and Smith, "Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16."

<sup>55</sup>James A. Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

<sup>56</sup>Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); "What Is Freedom?," in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1968). Also, Don Herzog, *Sovereignty, Rip* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Joan Cocks, *On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).

<sup>57</sup>Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 234. Also, Lars Rensmann, "Rethinking European Democracy after Its Legitimacy Crisis: On Hannah Arendt and the European Union," *Journal of European Studies* 49, no. 3–4 (2019).

is sovereign. The famous sovereignty of political bodies has always been an illusion, which moreover, can be maintained only by the instruments of violence."<sup>58</sup> Arendt means that the sovereign nation may likely encounter people who do not fit its predetermined will somehow. These people, obstacles to sovereign will, must be oppressed to the will; they must submit to preserve the illusion of sovereignty. Thus, Arendt argues that the concept of sovereignty assumes a predetermined will which is "pernicious and dangerous" because it can lead to tyranny, violence, and oppression. If people wish to be free, "it is precisely their sovereignty they must renounce."<sup>59</sup>

Arendt's connection between sovereignty and violence allows us to see the post-Brexit hate crimes in a new way. This framework ties hate crimes to a larger narrative of political ideas, such as sovereignty, exit, and ethnic purity. According to the VL narrative, the U.K.'s national exit would create a sovereign nation that was more homogeneous and united. Theirs was a fantasy about sovereignty.<sup>60</sup> My argument illuminates how destructive and pernicious this expectation may have been. Perpetrators of hate crimes may have attempted to demonstrate this (impossible notion) of democratic sovereignty by casting "outsiders" from the body politic. Not waiting for the state to act, they perhaps marked the boundary of 'our country' and 'our law' themselves. They may have defined (the illusion) of sovereign will and the political body through acts of exclusion: "outsiders" deemed enemies to the sovereign will were ostracized through public acts of abuse, shaming, and violence. Abusing individuals believed to be immigrants or hostile to Brexit may become proof of sovereignty: the illusion made real.

My point is neither to excuse these crimes nor to diminish the perpetrators' guilt. These crimes still are crimes – that is, they are individual violations of the law that should be punished to the full extent of the law. My point is to see the potential connections between these actions and a seemingly harmless idea about a sovereign national exit. If we focus too much on the individual nature of hate crimes or understand the perpetrators as a few "bad apples," we may miss the role of political ideas in legitimating unjust and evil actions against vulnerable individuals. We also may miss the culpability of concepts that, like exit, are beneficial in other contexts. My framework suggests that exit, combined with sovereignty, can be a factor in the destructive drive toward ethnic purity and homogeneity. The Brexit referendum may have created a shock, a moment that concentrated or exacerbated the destructive energies of sovereignty onto those individuals who were seen as different or other from the sovereign will.

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<sup>58</sup>Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," 164. To put this slightly differently, exit as a sovereignty mechanism creates the illusion that what Arendt calls "I-will" and "I-can" are in harmony. As Arendt notes, this is a fantasy; "I-will" and the "I-can" are different. Violence may be used to maintain the illusion of a sovereign exit, forcing the "I-can" to conform to the "I-will." *Ibid.*, 160–65.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 165. It is crucial to note that Arendt's framework suggests that the concept of *individual* sovereignty can be destructive, too. Arendt's theory, then, suggests that BSE's conceptualization of exit as a mechanism of *individual* sovereignty could also lead to oppression and tyranny. This eventuality did not occur in the Brexit case; BSE adherents were not perpetrators of hate crimes. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, further research may be able to illuminate Arendt's insight and show the destructive potential of an individual sovereign exit.

<sup>60</sup>Herzog, *Sovereignty, Rip*.

## Conclusion: Exit as a Malleable Political Concept

Exit may appear to be a harmless, even beneficial concept. As we have seen, many scholars have associated exit with numerous positive attributes: exit rights allow individuals to become sovereign, self-directed, and self-determining. However, I have questioned these positive associations. Through studying the Brexit campaign, I found conceptual connections between national sovereign exit and hate crimes, which suggests exit has a more troubling side.

This worrisome side of exit, I argued, is most apparent in VL's mapping of an individual sovereign exit onto the nation-state. Their vision of exit was a fantasy that simplified the complexities of a U.K. separation from the E.U. Rather than being a diverse political body composed of pluralistic groups, VL assumed the U.K. was a cohesive entity that, like a person, could walk away. Moreover, VL claimed to want democracy. VL thought that a sovereign exit from the E.U. would create more democracy in the U.K.

Nevertheless, just the opposite was the case. VL's fantasy of a national sovereign exit was profoundly anti-democratic because it made no space for pluralism and, relying on a predetermined will, it shut out true democratic freedom. As Arendt suggested, chasing the illusion of sovereign freedom can lead to the opposite: oppression and violence toward those seen to impede the sovereign will.

A critic might question whether the comparison between VL and BSE is valid. These two groups, it might be said, used exit to advance divergent agendas: BSE used exit to welcome E.U. immigrants to the U.K., while VL used exit to shut down borders to immigrants. While it is true that each group used exit to achieve distinct ends, it is a mistake to miss the underlying theoretical similarities. We can see how malleable exit can be when we see the latent theoretical connections – exit as an expression of sovereignty, a statement of values, and an assertion of identity. Moreover, exit is a fluid signifier. A political struggle like Brexit reveals that exit can comfortably fit a wide range of politics and ideologies.

Like other fundamental political concepts, exit is neither inherently good nor evil. It can be conceptualized in different ways. For example, exit can be a source of pluralistic freedom, resistance, and even democratic solidarity, if conceptualized differently than by VL. In a similar vein, supporting Brexit was not causally related to committing hate crimes. Many supporters of Brexit condemned those who engaged in hate crimes. This fact suggests that the connection between exit, national sovereignty, and hate is potential. It is neither automatic nor ineluctable.

However, none of this is apparent by adhering to an arms-length scholarly approach to exit. Many theorists studying exit have tended to think about it in abstract terms, as exit rights, for instance, removed from the messy reality of political struggle. Brexit presented just that – a disorderly political struggle –and it allowed the opportunity to study exit *in situ*. We can, in turn, complicate our understanding of exit by seeing how it is deployed within contemporary political life.

In short, we need to be more attentive to exit as it appears in the political world. We also should be skeptical of it. While exit may seem innocuous or straightforward on its face – it may seem like merely departing – this was not the case in Brexit. In this context, leaving was not just leaving. Instead, the exit was loaded with political



meaning and significance. So rather than seeing the exit as self-explanatory or innocent, we should ask who or what is leaving. We should analyze how exit serves ideological ends. Moreover, we should be attentive to the consequences of the exit for vulnerable individuals.

### Disclosure statement

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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## Appendix



**Figure A.1.** Vote Leave Turkey Poster.

Sources: The official Vote Leave campaign released this poster in May 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/21/vote-leave-prejudice-turkey-eu-security-threat>.



**Figure A.2.** Leave E.U. Breaking Point Poster.

The unofficial Leave E.U. campaign released this poster on Jun 16, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants>.

