


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Panacea or Palliative? An Analysis of the National Police Corps Program

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I. INTRODUCTION

Part of the history of criminal justice innovation has been the search for panaceas—magic solutions to the system's seemingly intractable problems. Frequently, the enthusiasm for these supposed solutions is indicated by the fact that supporters include figures on both the political left and the political right. Also, "evidence" in favor of the efficacy of the solution is always much more "testimonial" than empirically based. Three recent examples of such innovations can be found in the area of Federal Sentencing Reform (constructing the Federal Guidelines, doing away with the indeterminate sentence), the boot camp movement (placing offenders in boot camp rather than in jail or prison), and the Police Corps. Like Federal Sentencing Reform and the boot camp movement, the Police Corps promises to solve numerous problems, has attracted support from both the left and the right, and is predicated more on exhortations about the good that will flow from obtaining college educated police than it is on solid empirical evidence.

The Police Corps proposal is the brainchild of New York attorney Adam Walinsky, former aide to Robert Kennedy, who has made the enactment of a Police Corps, in one form or another, a lifetime objective.¹ The purpose of the

proposal, modeled after the Reserve Officer Training Corps, is to upgrade the size and quality of the police force by financing college education for students in return for 4 years of service as a state or local police officer. The proposal also stipulates that corps members are to be deployed in a "community policing" style. Supporters of the Police Corps also hope to cultivate a more diverse and representative police force. (In fact, a Justice Department survey showed that 45% of black college students surveyed would be interested in participating in the police corps if it were established.²) And, finally, the Police Corps is hailed as a "new civic enterprise." As the Progressive Policy Institute urged,

Crime is a powerful corrosive agent that breaks down our sense of mutual trust and affection. . . . Without civic participation and cooperation, the police risk being seen as an alien occupying force rather than an integral part of communities they are supposed to protect. The Police Corps recognizes that crime-fighting must ultimately be a civic enterprise.³

Advocates assert that rotating corps members on a 4-year cycle and infusing wider communities with former police officers will foster a sense of civic duty and an understanding of the need for community involvement in law enforcement.

These favorable arguments ultimately proved convincing. On September 13, 1994, Congress finally passed the Police Corps proposal as a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which President Clinton signed into law. Last minute compromises resulted in the placement of Police Corps money outside the trust fund and limited the funding to \$100 million and 5 years.⁴ This cut in funding from the initial \$400 million sum only funds approximately 1200 Police Corps cadets as opposed to the initially planned 100,000. According to the legislation, Police Corps cadets are to receive \$7500 per academic year or \$10,000 per calendar year, but total expenditures per participant are not to exceed \$30,000. Repayment of these educational loans require participants to serve for 4 years in a state or local police department.

Disappointed by this severe reduction of the Police Corps, Walinsky stated that, in order "[t]o have any serious impact, this number of officers could not be spread over more than three or four medium sized jurisdictions."⁵ One commentator surmised, "what was intended to upgrade and transform America's police has become merely a demonstration project."⁶ The \$10 million that the Police Corps received in 1996 and the \$20 million in 1997 are funding pilot programs in Maryland, Arkansas, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, and North Carolina.⁷ Maryland, specifically the Baltimore Police Department, received the most federal funding, \$6.5 million of the initial \$10 million, and began training 45 corps members in the fall of 1997.⁸ In order to jump start the program and get Police Corps cadets on the street as soon as possible, these first trainees were selected after they completed 4 years of college and they are using the promised college funding retroactively. Combining the legislatively sanctioned two 8-week sum-

mer training sessions into one intense 16-week period, the training offers courses on ethics, juvenile boot camps, the media, welfare, victims rights, and race relations.

Unlike many of the program's supporters, we suggest that the Police Corps' limited funding does not represent a setback but rather a potential for much needed empirical research about the possibilities for national implementation. Making a virtue of limited funding, the pilot programs will provide a number of test sites in which to study the Police Corps. Recently, Walinsky has expressed a similar understanding of the pilot programs. Commenting on the program in Baltimore, he stated, "We're going to learn as we go along. Look, we're going to make mistakes. They'll be setbacks. Did we pick the right people? Is the training as good as we think it is? That's why we're only starting with forty [cadets]."9

In general, we agree with this more deliberate and reflective approach to the Police Corps. As opposed to Walinsky, however, we argue that the pilot programs offer the opportunity to do far more than simply work out minor kinks in implementation. If properly studied, these test sites can provide initial data on the program's fundamental claims about reforming police work, behavior, and culture. These claims, which sound plausible in political speeches and in newsprint, appear far more formidable from the perspective of social science research on the police. Taking a closer look at the program's purported benefits, we argue that the study of the pilot programs must include an examination of the Police Corps claims that an increase in officers leads to a decrease in crime, that an infusion of young officers will transform police culture, and that a college education is essential to effective police work. Through an examination of the pilot programs, with these criteria in mind, the Police Corps has the potential to be more than a rhetorical panacea or a temporary palliative.

II. AN ISSUE WITHOUT TWO SIDES

The national conversation about the Police Corps presents the proposal as something of a policy wonk's dream.¹⁰ Rather than heated, bitter political debates and entrenched partisan positions, the proposal has garnered widespread bipartisan approval. "Debating" the Police Corps has, more often than not, signaled an opportunity to lament the national crime level and assert the ameliorating effects of a college educated corps of young officers.¹¹ This level of political agreement about the Police Corps is likely attributable to the content and design of the policy itself. Rather than the result of a compromise between political parties, the Police Corps presents a means for both liberal and conservative goals to be accomplished simultaneously. The "liberal" agenda of creating a national police force more attune to the root causes of crime and increasing access to higher education is accomplished alongside the "conservative" goal of preserving social order through a tangible police presence and the threat of punishment.

Moreover, the Police Corps program also speaks to libertarian concerns through the promise of enforcement officers who are more aware of and deferential to the strictures of constitutional law. Finally, communitarians are pleased with the Police Corps commitment to developing local police forces that are more intricately involved with the community as well as creating a sense of civic duty among the young. In its ability to concurrently address such a wide range of political interests, the Police Corps represents one example of what Stuart Nagel has referred to as a “win-win” policy—that is, “combining (rather than compromising) alternatives [and] developing a package with something for each major viewpoint.”¹²

In Congress this win-win element of the Police Corps program is particularly apparent in the program’s primary sponsors: Barney Frank (D-MA) and Bob Dornan (R-CA) in the House and Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Jim Sasser (D-TN) in the Senate. Of this unexpected alliance, Dornan asserted that “What brings us together is the harsh reality of crime in our country. This is certainly not an ideological issue. It is a survival issue.”¹³ One commentator accounted for the program’s bipartisan appeal by suggesting that “Conservatives like [the Police Corps] because it would add more cops—20 percent nationally, almost all of whom would go into community policing . . . ; liberals like it because college graduates might leaven the macho Blue Culture that seems to breed brutality.”¹⁴

In addition to this mix of congressional supporters, President Clinton has advocated the Police Corps as a means to boost civic responsibility as well as a method of criminal justice reform. Indeed, as governor of Arkansas, Clinton was convinced by Walinsky at the Democratic Leadership Council that the Police Corps could work at the state level.¹⁵ The Arkansas Police Corps Planning Commission, through the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Arkansas, Little Rock, established a framework to administer anticipated federal funds for a Police Corps program. In 1992, Arkansas awarded its first 15 police corps cadets with scholarships. At the federal level, Clinton’s admiration for Walinsky’s concept eventually proved to be an enormous turning point for the realization of a national Police Corps program. The establishment of a Police Corps figured into Clinton’s campaign promises in 1992 and his eventual presidential backing provided the “policy window” necessary to move the Police Corps concept out of the congressional doldrums and into legislation.¹⁶

Joining this congressional and presidential support, the majority of the law enforcement community endorsed the program as well. The Fraternal Order of Police, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Officers, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and the National Sheriffs Association have all voiced support for the Police Corps. Agreeing with the policy’s assertion that a sheer increase in the number of police is a deterrent of crime, many of these organizations

backed the Police Corps wholeheartedly after legislative stipulations that the program could not be used to inexpensively replace existing officers. Moreover, the predicted diversification of the police through the Police Corps also proved an attractive notion to many police organizations.¹⁷

The Police Corps has also won approval from the press—the numerous articles and editorials have been overwhelmingly favorable. Joe Klein indicated that the Police Corps is the “logical place to start . . . to rebuild a national sense of community, responsibility and public altruism.”¹⁸ William Raspberry referred to the program as a method of “preventing crime, busting up open air drug markets and contributing to the internal discipline of neighborhoods.”¹⁹ A still more supportive William F. Buckley proclaimed that this “bright and engaging idea ought to be welcomed with enthusiasm.”²⁰

The enthusiastic welcome that the Police Corps concept has received from Congress, President Clinton, police organizations, and the media is predominantly the result of the program’s zealous advocate and Chair of the National Committee for the Police Corps. Walinsky’s 14 years of tirelessly intoning the absolute necessity of a national Police Corps program has been described in the press as “his personal crusade” and an example of “his unbending, unyielding, uncompromising persistence.”²¹ Indeed, the extent of Walinsky’s lobbying efforts, speaking engagements, and writings about the Police Corps compelled him to relinquish his partnership in a New York law firm.²² In addition to the sheer time he has devoted to the Police Corps, Walinsky’s ability to skillfully alter his Police Corps pitch to appeal to conservatives, liberals, and communitarians alike is, to a great extent, responsible for the general lack of opposition to the program. Walinsky has convinced virtually everyone that an intuitively appealing idea is indeed a beneficial government program that will reduce crime, mend communities, and mitigate the authoritarian tendency within police culture.

III. ANOTHER SIDE?

The Police Corps may, of course, deliver on all of its common sense promises and, like any public policy, it may not meet expectations. While uncertainty is the risk of political action in general, the Police Corps concept is particularly contingent on implementation because much of its claims are simply that—claims without a strong backing in criminal justice research. Marked by a tendency toward self-evident appeal or “literature by assertion,” the national conversation about the Police Corps largely failed to explore the social science research for support of these arguments. This oversight is significant given the initial size of the program, approximately 100,000 corps members, and the projected national implementation cost of \$1 billion. Even given the limited funds that have been appropriated to the program, attention to empirical research re-

mains important. The successful development of the Police Corps into a full scale national program will likely rest on the empirically supported benefits and limitations of the program.

To enrich future discussion about the Police Corps, we examine some implicit or explicit hypotheses in this program that are contradicted or unsettled within the research on law enforcement. In addition to an examination of criminal justice research, our thoughts on the Police Corps are the result of several focus group discussions with police chiefs and two undergraduate seminars on the program and community policing. Speaking with the intended beneficiaries of the Police Corps (the police chiefs and undergraduate students) helped to sharpen some legislative misconceptions about both of these groups. We benefited greatly from these candid and lively discussions.

In addition, our analysis is indebted to the research of each of the 25 students who participated in the Police Corps and Community Policing seminars. In response to our animated and wide-ranging seminar discussions, each student developed a major research project about a particular aspect of the Police Corps program.²³ The students' interest in the concept ranged from researching the effect of education on the police practice of racial profiling, to examining the potential of the program to lead to more representative police departments, to proposing a college curriculum for the Police Corps cadets. The methods used in these research papers—participant observation, interviews, econometric analysis, and survey research—also added to the range and complexity of the students' work. As the instructors of this course, many of our initial thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses of the Police Corps were confirmed by the students' studies. Despite the small sample size of these empirical projects, several consistent themes emerged. These common motifs are presented in the following five hypotheses about the Police Corps.

A. The Patrol Rigmarole

It does not take a college graduate to conclude that these [high crime statistics] illustrate the need for a greater number of law enforcement officers. Senator Heinz²⁴

First, only much larger numbers of police on patrol, in neighborhoods, can begin to reestablish community order and safety . . . we must begin to deter crime before it is committed . . . I believe that more police patrolling aggressively and investigation and acting against a greater proportion of crimes will significantly reduce the present terrible levels of crime.

Senator Kerry²⁵

Today's vastly undermanned police forces, whose officers race from call to call, taking endless reports of crimes they were not around to prevent, do not control the streets . . . *That* is what we need at least half a million new officers just to begin to change.

Adam Walinsky²⁶

When it comes to cops, more is better.

*The New York Post*²⁷

Surprisingly, the simple assertion that more police officers on patrol reduces crime has not been sustained by social science research on preventive patrol. As early as the 1970s, experiments indicate that variation in the number of officers on continuous, moving surveillance does not affect inevitably the amount of criminal activity. In a pioneering study in Kansas City, Mo., in 1970, the city was divided into three sections composed of roughly similar populations, crime rates, and requests for police assistance. Within each of these sections, three different strategies of patrolling were tested over the course of a year. On the first beat, patrolling consisted of a single car on surveillance when not answering calls for assistance. The second beat, referred to as "proactive patrol," was patrolled by at least two or three vehicles at a time. On the third beat, officers did no preventive patrol but only responded to specific calls for police services. Analyzed by George Kelling, the results of this experiment were counterintuitive.

After a year, no substantial differences among the three areas were observed in criminal activity, amount of reported crime, rate of victimization as revealed in a follow-up survey, level of citizen fear, or degree of citizen satisfaction with the police. For all practical purposes, the changes in preventative patrol made no difference at all (28).

Since this early finding, numerous other studies have examined this questionable connection between police and crime control.²⁹ Repeatedly, the common sense assertion that the number of police on the beat negatively affects the crime rate has been thrown into question. David Bayley perhaps sums up the research most forcefully. He states, "The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it."³⁰ In the case of the Police Corps, this pervasive myth only sets up false expectations of what this program can realistically accomplish. While we await specific research about the Police Corps' effect on crime prevention, it is reasonable to suggest that it is unlikely that this program will dramatically reduce crime solely because there is an increase in police on patrol.

B. A False Economy?

The localities that [Police Corps cadets] serve would pay their salaries, but in most cases they could avoid paying their pension benefits and seniority raises down the line. Over the long term, corps members would cost far less than career officers.

*Time Magazine*³¹

This argument, which is repeated in virtually every article and statement about the Police Corps program, seems to make sense. Indeed, in terms of pen-

sions and benefits, the federally funded program does offer significant savings to state and local police forces. What the program does not grant, however, are the resources to actually hire Police Corps cadets for their 4 years of service. Therefore, the program will not provide additional officers to communities in the midst of a budget crisis or hiring freeze. Even if local and state governments do have the funds to hire Police Corps officers, training expenses suggest that the Police Corps is also a poor long-term investment. In addition to the 16 weeks of training offered through the federal program, Police Corps cadets, like all new recruits, must train for approximately a year. The cost of this training is justified by the number of years that a career officer will provide to law enforcement. For the Police Corps, the benefits of this expensive training abruptly cease after 4 years.³² Many police chiefs we spoke with indicated that it takes about 4 years for a police officer to become truly proficient in his or her position.

If local or state governments would like to recoup this training cost and hire a cadet on a career track, they must provide all of the funding. In this sense, the Police Corps program is not designed to provide state and local forces with veteran officers or an opportunity for young people to discover whether they are interested in law enforcement as a career. The program, designed primarily for completing 4 years of service after college, makes no provision for those who would like to remain within law enforcement. Rather than attracting students interested in career positions, the Police Corps seems to do the opposite. It encourages and provides financial backing to those for whom policing is only a pause along the way to another career. In terms of training expenses and the composition of the "veteran" officer corps, the Police Corps program is both short sighted and less of a boon to local and state forces than many have assumed.

C. Metamorphosis: "Everything You Hate About Cops, You'd Become in Two Years."

The remedy for bad policing is for good people to join the police force and make it better.

Adam Walinsky³³

The four year cycle of officers through a department could ventilate an inbred squad room subculture.

*The New York Times*³⁴

We have to break this kind of blue mentality, this cult-like mentality, that we have among the police, and there's a way to do it. There's a program called the Police Corps We need to have a different class of cops.

Joe Klein³⁵

The regular infusion of fresh talent could bring a new spirit to the alienated squad room subculture that feeds cynicism and burnout, even protects the brutal or corrupt.

*The New York Times*³⁶

Police Corps advocates often assert that an infusion of young college educated police officers will improve the culture of police departments. Their presence will mitigate notorious police behavior such as the impenetrable “blue veil” and “testilying.”³⁷ This premise is more open to question than a quick glance might suggest. Jerome E. McElroy, director of New York’s Criminal Justice Agency and co-author of *Community Policing: The CPOP Program in New York*, rephrased this assertion as the question: To what extent will Police Corps cadets be absorbed by police culture? For instance, to what extent will these young cadets be able to avoid seeing themselves as radically separated from the police community? Will their college education and perspectives as non-career officers actually change the behavior of the “veteran” officers? Or, will they, by virtue of their experiences as enforcers of the law, adopt the common us/them orientation of seasoned officers?³⁸ The answer, according to one police chief at a focus group, was simply, “Everything you hate about [the] police, you’d become in two years.”

This practical observation is borne out by research. Much of the research of adult institutional socialization suggests that it is likely that newcomers will either adopt organizational norms or become isolated.³⁹ This research indicates that a particularly predominant mode of behavior often occurs in response to specific demands experienced within the organization. Thus, newcomers learn the importance of institutional norms through performing certain tasks. Often this experiential learning process ironically involves disregarding the lessons of formal education. Even without Police Corps cadets, this process of setting aside lessons of the classroom for lessons of experience already exists among police officers. Several empirical studies support the argument that officers learn about law enforcement on the street as opposed to in the academy. Although this street knowledge may contradict the dictates of law and policy, its persistence indicates the difficulty of changing police culture. It will not be as easy as many Police Corps pundits and advocates suggest.

D. Community Policing: Flowers in the Holsters

The Police Corps would put cops where they are most needed: on the street. Because rookies begin their careers on patrol, it is estimated that the number of beat pounders could increase by 40%.

*Time Magazine*⁴⁰

The college educated cops would likely bring more motivation to community patrolling that civil service recruits.

*The New York Times*⁴¹

The amendment creates a new corps of men and women willing to commit their talent and energy to law enforcement.

Senator Kennedy⁴²

The beauty of [the Police Corps] idea is that it will . . . create a police force that is . . . younger and more idealistic.

*Daily News*⁴³

The picture suggested by these quotations is that young, energetic, and idealistic Police Corps cadets are the perfect officers to be assigned to community policing patrol. Despite speculation that any of these adjectives correctly describe officers who are paying back a federal loan through police service, there is a question as to whether rookies are best equipped to handle the requirements of a community policing position. Although a nebulous term, community policing often implies extensive contact with civilians (i.e., walking the beat) and collaborative proactive problem solving with community members. As one police chief summed up the inherent contradictions of community policing, the position requires officers to have “flowers in [their] holsters.” A rookie who is not well versed in the department’s history of community relations or how particular issues are addressed by the local police may not be adequately prepared to deal with the public so extensively. In addition, corps members in a community policing position may encounter further ostracism in departments because community policing is often perceived as not being “real” police work.

E. Copping an Education

You do not have to be a college graduate to be a good cop, but there is one thing for sure—it will help.

Senator Bumpers⁴⁴

[The Police Corps] would add additional police officers who are trained, able to cope with the technical problems on search and seizures, on confessions, on lineups, and the myriad other legal requirements which have been established by the Supreme Court . . . in this modern era.

Senator Specter⁴⁵

College educated officers seem to communicate better with the public and are better decisionmakers. Officers with higher education are the subject of fewer citizen complaints and are more sensitive to the needs of racial and ethnic groups.

Senator Graham⁴⁶

As these comments reveal, there is almost a consensus by fiat that a better educated police force is a better police force. But there are a host of questions raised by this belief. Is “improvement” directly and linearly related to greater education? Can education penetrate the “police culture”? Are there circumstances in which more education might not be beneficial (for instance, officers experience much boredom in their jobs; perhaps college educated police officers are less able to handle this boredom)?

Indeed, a recent survey of research on the effect of college education on police work indicates that, on most performance measures, advanced education does not make a significant difference.⁴⁷ The hypotheses that college educated officers are less cynical, are less likely to receive complaints, reprimands, and suspensions, are more pleased with their positions, are more likely to receive awards, and are more likely to avoid on-the-job injury and excessive sick leave are all inconclusively or not at all supported by empirical research. This survey concludes that, “although a fair amount of research has been accumulated, it cannot be concluded that higher education has any major affects on police behavior, positive or otherwise.”⁴⁸

One method of addressing these findings is to question what specific attributes of college education are to assist police officers in their duties. Does a college education improve an officer’s ability to crystallize thoughts and to reflect critically, assuage prejudice, cope with ambiguity, understand human nature, control an authoritarian tendency, effectively communicate, or work well within a hierarchical management structure? In short, a difficulty with the Police Corps legislation is that it does not address the particular qualities or skills a college education presumably develops or improves. Although the congressional debates make repeated reference to Police Corps cadets who will be knowledgeable enough to counter sophisticated criminals, the legislation does not specify a particular course of study while in college. There is no explicit attempt to combine formal education with the law enforcement and civil service component of the Police Corps position.⁴⁹ Given all of the educational expectations of Police Corps officers, a minimal, required program of study while in college gives more force to the simple notion that college education improves law enforcement.

Police Corps students need to read about what others have written about the police. A very clear picture of the “world of policing” emerges from these materials and it is imperative that students be familiar with this world before becoming officers themselves. These readings should also include much on the latest trend in policing—community policing. And although there is no exact consensus on exactly what this phrase means, it seems to include officers walking the beat, “handling” problems without necessarily making arrests, and interacting with the community to proactively address local problems with crime. Also, Police Corps cadets should be exposed to academic research on adult socialization. If, as officers, these cadets are to meaningfully transform police forces, then an awareness of this literature is necessary. This knowledge will not, of course, provide straightforward solutions for specific problems but, at a minimum, it will acquaint Police Corps cadets with the scope and rationale for a distinct police culture.

Finally, we recommend that cadets participate in at least one internship within the criminal justice system. This network of the police, the courts, and the prisons is sometimes aptly referred to as a “nonsystem” because the various

parts do not labor in concert toward one or more goals. More often than not, each part defines its own goals, blames other pieces of the system for failure to achieve these goals, and resists meaningful cooperation. One spectacular opportunity afforded by a Police Corps internship is to provide at the undergraduate level the kind of system perspective that is never obtained in the real world of policing. By placing interns in all parts of the criminal justice system and leading them in a discussion of their experiences with their Police Corps peers, a broader perspective, which is so sorely missed within most police forces, ought to begin to develop. Moreover, internships provide the Police Corps cadets an opportunity to learn through participant observation and to develop an understanding of the constraints of the criminal justice system. Our own experiences with teaching courses connected with experiential learning suggests that these internships will invaluablely broaden and deepen cadets' comprehension of the criminal justice system.⁵⁰

IV. LESS IS MORE

Confronting crime and criminal justice policy, there is a tendency to be satisfied with ostensibly straightforward answers to intricate, pervasive problems. As many of the excerpts in this article reveal, the public, understandably, wants high crime and the unappealing aspects of police culture to be solved as quickly and as effortlessly as possible. The cycle of public concern with the shortcomings of law enforcement, however, indicates that the quick fix approach is more of a palliative than a substantive response. As this article suggests, eloquent national debates about law enforcement reform and meaningful policy are furthered by an awareness of social science research. Our research on the Police Corps suggests that at least five of the hypothetical benefits of the program need to be examined in greater detail and with an eye to empirical data.

First, the insistence of Police Corps proponents that an increase in the number of police on the beat will decrease crime is not supported by social science research. Although admittedly the Police Corps Cadets will comprise a different sample than the one examined in the Kelling study, these findings must be addressed by the program's supporters. To ignore this research only creates false expectations about what the program can reasonably accomplish.

Second, the Police Corps program is purported to provide a significant savings to local police department through a reduction in pension costs. The training costs necessary to place cadets on the street, however, may mitigate the initial appeal of lowered pension costs. Because police departments will not recoup any benefit of police training of cadets beyond their 4 years of service, the long-term expense of this training is increased. The program essentially swaps decreased pension costs for increased long-term training costs. While this shift in resources

may be justified, proponents of the program need to be clear that in one sense the Police Corps represents increased expenditures for state and local police departments.

Advocates of the program have also praised the Police Corps potential to transform police culture through an infusion of young, energetic, and idealistic officers. Yet, interviews with many local police chiefs and officers and a review of the literature on adult institutional isolation indicates that cadets will likely find their role as a reformer extremely difficult. Rather than radically altering blue culture, cadets will likely either adapt to their environment or become isolated. Neither path bodes well for the transformative power of the Police Corps cadets. The cadets trainers cannot simply assume that through mere force of numbers the Police Corps will alter a complex institution like the police. Special attention and training must be paid to the challenging task of leading institutional reform of an institution and a group of individuals that are much older than the cadets themselves.

Another central claim of the Police Corps program is that cadets are particularly well suited for the duties of community policing. Indeed, a stipulation of the federal legislation is that all Police Corps cadets ought be assigned to community policing and preventive patrol positions. However, the legislation fails to explain what the term "community policing" specifically means. In addition to this ambiguity, there has been no explanation in the political arena or the press as to why young and relatively inexperienced Police Corps officers are well equipped to serve on community patrol. This particular assignment involves an intricate and careful balancing of law enforcement duties and public relations responsibilities. Interviews with the supervisors of community policing officers reveal that rookie officers simply are not prepared for the challenge of responding to these shifting duties. Moreover, because many officers do not consider community policing to be a genuine or necessary part of police work, community policing officers are often isolated from their counterparts on regular patrol. The isolation resulting from their community policing assignments may well mitigate the ability of the Police Corps cadets to alter police culture. In other words, the Police Corps' goal of placing more officers in community policing positions may hinder another of the program's aims—that is, transforming police culture.

The final hypothesis of Police Corps proponents we address is the assertion that an education positively influences police behavior. Put simply, Police Corps advocates assert that college educated officers are better officers. Although this relationship between learning and performance has a great deal of common sense appeal, the empirical analysis does not indicate that education positively affects police behavior. Although a general and undefined education does not improve performance, we suggest that a specific program of study would significantly improve Police Corps cadets' ability to become effective officers. Specifically, we recommend that, while in college, Police Corps cadets study academic litera-

ture about the police, community policing, and adult socialization. We also advise that Police Corps cadets participate in at least one internship in the criminal justice system. In addition to the benefits of experiential learning and participant observation, cadets will have the opportunity in these internships to see the criminal justice system from a vantage point that is different from their eventual role as police officers. Given the fragmentation of the criminal justice system, the addition of officers with a more holistic perspective would be an enormous benefit of the Police Corps.

Given our questioning of many of the assertions of the Police Corps program, we understand the program's limited funding status as a virtue rather than a setback. The establishment of pilot programs in Maryland, Arkansas, Nevada, Oregon, North Carolina, and South Carolina provides the opportunity to gather empirical information about the program's national potential. Indeed, each site affords the possibility of empirically testing many of the program's purported benefits. It may well be that the Police Corps cadets' behavior will vary significantly from the previously researched samples that we cite here. At a minimum, however, earlier research indicates the necessity of researching the Police Corps cadets efficacy rather than boldly asserting their boundless potential. More researching and less asserting will enable the Police Corps program to avoid the seemingly inescapable fate of most criminal justice innovation—as an illusory panacea or transient palliative.

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7. South Carolina received \$1.08 million; Oregon, \$910,000; North Carolina, \$450,000; Arkansas \$225,000; and Nevada, \$222,500. The \$20 million appropriated in the 1997 budget has attracted 11 other states to vie for participation in the Police Corps pilot program. President Clinton requested \$20 million in the 1998 budget. Janofsky, M. (1997) Police in Baltimore try a new kind of recruiting. *The New York Times* 30 March.

8. Fifteen of the 45 recruits are from Charleston, SC, and will return there. Four of the 45 recruits are women.
9. Janofsky, M. (1997). Police in Baltimore try a new kind of recruiting. *The New York Times* 30 March.
10. There is, of course, another reading of the legislative history of the Police Corps that presents a bleaker account. Despite benefits of a zealous advocate and a groundswell of bipartisan support, the procedure of translating the Police Corps idea into legislation was marked by numerous problems and delays. Moreover, the enacted Police Corps program is arguably a mere shadow of Walinsky's grand concept. In one sense, it seemed that the necessary levels of examination and approval ranging from four Congressional committees, two floor votes, and a presidential signature simply overwhelmed and fatigued a fresh idea. Much like the case studies developed in Reid, TR. (1980). *Congressional Odyssey: The Saga of a Senate bill* (WH Freeman) and Martin, J. (1994). *Lessons from the Hill: The Legislative Journey of an Education Program* (St. Martin), the Police Corps legislative journey suggests a cumbersome process.
11. The two members of Congress to vocally oppose the Police Corps proposal were Representatives Jack Brooks (D-TX), the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC). Thurmond objected to the substantial federal funds to be expended for the program. In addition, he argued that

Despite the fact that the Federal Government would be spending all of this money to pay for individuals' education, there is no certainty that the State and local law enforcement agencies could absorb 20,000 new officers a year. Finally, the legislation does not require that students take law enforcement related courses while in college, nor does it require a significant commitment to law enforcement—the individual would only have to stay in law enforcement for four years to receive benefits and then he or she could move on . . . there has been no evidence presented which indicates that current recruits are unqualified. In addition, even if those who participated in the program do prove to be more qualified, there is no guarantee that they will stay in law enforcement.

Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9077.

12. Nagel, S. S. (1995). Win-win policy. *Policy Studies Journal* 23, 181–182.
13. O'Rourke, K. (1989). Bill links police duty, student aid. *Chicago Tribune*, 13 July.
14. Klein, J. (1992). Copping a domestic agenda. *Newsweek* 7 December, 29.
15. Gest, T. (1993). The selling of an alluring concept. *US News & World Report* 25 January, 67.
16. Kingdon, J. (1984). *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
17. One vocal opponent of the Police Corps is the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Steven Harris, the President of the Association, argued in the organization's trade journal that the Police Corps program is no more than a proposed panacea to the violent crime problem. Harris asserted specifically that police

forces do not lack college educated candidates but rather the funds to hire these candidates. He notes that the Police Corps program does not actually address the problem of insufficient local funding to hire additional corps officers but merely provides more college educated candidates. Harris also criticized the federal program's stipulation that Corps officers be used only for community policing. This restriction severely limits the local police chief's efforts to address crime control within his or her particular community. Instead of the Police Corps, the IACP proposes to fund training programs for those in the military interested in law enforcement careers. According to Harris, recruiting from the military would reduce training costs, increase numbers, and improve minority representation. Harris, S. (1993). The myth of the Police Corps. *The Police Chief* February, 6.

18. Klein, J. (1992). Copping a domestic agenda. *Newsweek* December 7, 29.
19. Raspberry, W. (1990) Smart police. *The Washington Post* March 7.
20. Buckley, W. F. (1990). Police Corps idea logical and centsible too. *New York Daily News* April 3.
21. Klein, J. (1992). Copping a domestic agenda. *Newsweek* December 7, 29, and Kolbert, E. (1994). Lobbyist for public safety: Adam Walinsky. *The New York Times Magazine* October 20.
22. Endorsements from the deans of Yale Law School and University of Chicago Law School indicate the extent of Walinsky's lobbying efforts. Similarly, Walinsky was interviewed on the Charlie Rose Show (13 September 1995) and his "The Crisis of Public Order" appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* (July 1995).
23. Copies of the 25 undergraduate papers can be obtained by contacting the Rutgers University Political Science Department.
24. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9077.
25. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9075.
26. Walinsky, A. (1995). The crisis of public order. *The Atlantic Monthly*. July 1995: 54, emphasis original.
27. For safer streets: A Police Corps, *The New York Post* 21 July 1989.
28. As cited in Wilson, J. Q. (1983). *Thinking About Crime*, 67. New York: Vintage Books.
29. For a comprehensive overview of this literature, see D. Bayley's "Myth of the Police" chapter in *Police for the Future* (Oxford, 1994) pp. 3-12.
30. Bayley, D. (1994). "Myth of the Police," in *Police for the Future*, 3. New York: Oxford.
31. Kramer, M. (1990). From college to corps: the Police Corps would trade tuition for four years of patrol. *Time Magazine* March 5.
32. In addition to noting the significant time spent in training, one focus group of police chiefs pointed out that, in the last years of service, when the cadets will be attempting to find a new job, these officers may not be as productive as their career counterparts.
33. Walinsky, A. (1995). The crisis of public order. *The Atlantic Monthly* July, 54.
34. Support your local Police Corps. *The New York Times* 11 February 1990.
35. Klein, J. (1995). Race Relations, Part 2. Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, October 29.
36. To fight crime: A Police Corps. *The New York Times* 14 July 1989.
37. The term "blue veil" or "blue silence" refers to the widespread unwillingness of police officers to report their peers' inappropriate or illegal actions. "Testilying"

- refers to the alleged tendency for police officers to lie in a court of law in order to strengthen the possibility of a conviction. For a further explanation of this behavior as well as a discussion of some of its repercussions, see Butler, P. (1995). Racially based jury nullification: Black power in the criminal justice system. *Yale Law Journal* 105, 677–725.
38. McElroy, J., Cosgrove, C. and Sadd, S. 1993. *Community Policing: The CPOP in New York*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Ltd. McElroy's comments were made in a guest presentation during the Rutgers Police Corps Seminar.
 39. For instance, see Heumann, M. (1977). *Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 40. Kramer, M. (1990). From college to corps: The Police Corps would trade tuition for four years of patrol. *Time Magazine* March 5.
 41. Support your local Police Corps. *The New York Times* 11 February 1990.
 42. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9082.
 43. Newfield, J. (1996). A Police Corps could be city's lifeboat. *Daily News* February 5.
 44. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9076.
 45. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9073.
 46. Congressional Record. 28 June 1990: S9073.
 47. Jordan, W. (1994). College Education and Police Officer Performance—A Summation of the Research. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Miami, November 1994.
 48. Jordan, W. (1994). College Education and Police Officer Performance—A Summation of the Research. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Miami, November, 1994, p. 8.
 49. The legislation does require Police Corps cadets to attend two 8-week training sessions in the summers following their second and third years of college. Although this summer training period is not brief, it is not lengthy enough to accommodate all of our educational recommendations. Sixteen weeks is too short for cadets to learn the latest technological developments and legal restrictions on police activity, to study academic research on the police, community policing, and adult socialization, and to participate in at least one internship within the larger criminal justice network—including police, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, jail and prison officials, and community organizations concerned with crime.
 50. Both Police Corps seminars, which were supported by the Walt Whitman Center and Citizenship and Service Education (CASE) program at Rutgers University, involved an internship component. Students were required to work for a minimum of 80 hours a semester at their particular site, to discuss their experiences with their peers, and to reflect on the course material in light of their internship. The students' remarkable insights and understanding lead us to believe that an internship is a necessary component of any Police Corps program. For more information about the Rutgers seminars, see Heumann, M. (1997). The Police Corps: Researching Teaching and Teaching Research. In R. Battistoni and B. Hudson, (eds), *Service Learning in Political Science*. American Association of Higher Education. For an analysis of the importance of participant observation in political science research, see Johnson, C. (1990). Strategies for judicial research: soaking and poking in the judiciary. *Judicature* 73, 192–203.

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